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The Endless Judicial Selection Debate and Why it
Matters for Judicial Independence
CHARLES GARDNER GEYH*
In this overview, I begin by describing the five different systems of state
judicial selection that have evolved out of a perennial struggle to strike an
optimal balance between judicial independence and judicial accountability. I then
explore recent developments that have intensified that struggle before analyzing,
with reference to available research, how different selection systems counter or
accommodate Such developments. My purpose here is not to write (another)
position piece. Rather, my purpose is to step back and contextualize disputes over
judicial selection with reference to the independence and accountability issues
that animate them, and to isolate what we know and don't know about the
assumptions that underlie the arguments of the disputants, so as to better frame
future study and debate.
I. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, ACCOUNTABILITY AND SELECTION: THE
PERENNIAL STRUGGLE
Within the legal community judicial independence is understood not as an
intrinsic good or an end in itself, but as a means to achieve other ends. It is
thought that if judges are independent-if they are insulated from political and
other controls that could undermine their impartial judgment-they will be better
able to uphold the rule of law, preserve the separation of powers, and promote due
process of law.1 Scholars, judges and lawyers often acknowledge that judicial
independence has institutional and decisional dimensions. Institutional indepen-
dence concerns the capacity of the judiciary as a separate branch of government
to resist encroachments from the political branches and thereby preserve the
separation of powers. Decisional independence, in contrast, concerns the
capacity of individual judges to decide cases without threats or intimidation that
could interfere with their capacity to uphold the rule of law.
2
Properly understood, then, judicial independence is circumscribed by the
* John F. Kimberling Chair in Law, Indiana University at Bloomington. Thanks to Bert Brandenberg, Steve
Burbank, Barry Friedman, and Roy Schotland for their comments on an earlier draft, and to Ted Brassfield for
his research assistance.
.1. Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman, Reconsidering Judicial Independence, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
AT THE CROSSROADS 9, 11-14 (2002).
2. CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, WHEN COURTS & CONGRESS COLLIDE: THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF
AMERICA'S JUDICIAL SYSTEM 6-7 (2006).
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purposes it serves: Decisional independence, for example, does not mean
freedom from all external constraints, but only those constraints that interfere
with a judge's capacity to uphold the rule of law. Indeed, some forms of
independence from decisional constraint, such as the freedom to decide cases for
the benefit of friends or in exchange for bribes, are antithetical to the rule of law
values that judicial independence is supposed to further. And so, if judicial
independence is to achieve its goals, it must operate within specified constraints.
It must, in other words, be tempered by judicial accountability.
Like judicial independence, judicial accountability is not an end in itself. It too
serves other ends: To promote the rule of law, institutional responsibility, and
public confidence in the courts. And like judicial independence, judicial
accountability has multiple forms. Institutional accountability mechanisms hold
judges answerable collectively for their conduct as a separate branch of
government (e.g., by subjecting court budgets to legislative oversight). Behav-
ioral accountability mechanisms hold individual judges to account for their
conduct on and off the bench (e.g., by subjecting them to discipline for being
abusive to litigants or accepting inappropriate gifts from lawyers who appear
before them). And decisional accountability makes judges answerable for their
judicial rulings (e.g., by subjecting their decisions to appellate review).3 As to
decisional accountability, however, suitable mechanisms are ideally limited to
those that promote the rule of law by correcting judicial error. Mechanisms that
go further, and subject judges to threats or controls, could cause judges to
disregard the law and implement the preferences of those who threaten or control
them, to the detriment if not the demise of decisional independence.
Accepting for the moment the premises of the legal model (I revisit those
premises later), the perennial policy struggle is to strike an optimal balance
between judicial independence and accountability, to ensure that judges are
independent enough to follow the facts and law without fear or favor, but not so
independent as to disregard the facts or law to the detriment of the rule of law and
public confidence in the courts. The American Bar Association's Model Code of
Judicial Conduct ("Model Code"), some variation of which has been adopted by
almost every state supreme court, seeks to structure judicial conduct to preserve
this balance. The 2007 Code tells judges that they "shall act at all times in a
manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and
impartiality of the judiciary";4 "shall uphold and apply the law, and shall perform
all duties of judicial office fairly and impartially"; 5 "shall not be swayed by
public clamor or fear of criticism;"'6 "shall not permit family, social, political,
3. Charles Gardner Geyh, Rescuing Judicial Accountability from the Realm of Political Rhetoric, 56 CASE W.
REs. L. REV. 911 (2006).
4. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDucT R. 1.2 (2007) [hereinafter MODEL CODE].
5. MODEL CODER. 2.2
6. MODEL CODER. 2.4(A).
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financial, or other interests or relationships to influence the judge's judicial
conduct or judgment"; 7 and "shall not convey or permit others to convey the
impression that any person or organization is in a position to influence the
judge."8
In the context of judicial selection, the struggle to balance independence and
accountability has played itself out over the course of more than two centuries, as
five distinct methods of selecting judges-each striking the balance in different
ways-have vied for preeminence. In the fledgling states, all judges were
selected by one of two methods: Gubernatorial appointment with legislative
confirmation (five states) or legislative appointment (eight states). 9 The colonial
courts had been unhappily dependent on the crown, and the new states were
committed to curbing their judiciaries' dependence on the executive branch. This
is not to say, however, that the new states were committed to an independent
judiciary. Several states subjected their judges to a variety of legislative branch
controls, including re-appointment, which led to a series of independence-
threatening confrontations with state legislatures during the 1780s that troubled
the framers of the U.S. Constitution enough to embed in Article I tenure and
salary protections for federal judges. °
During the Jacksonian era of the 1820s and 1830s, populist calls for judicial
accountability initiated a movement to select judges via a third method: Partisan
judicial elections. Although the early impetus for partisan judicial elections may
have been a desire for greater accountability, the partisan election movement did
not take hold until after the Jacksonians lost influence, led by reformers who
argued that elected judges who derived their authority from the people would be
more independent-minded than hand-picked friends of governors, or jurists
subject to the beck and call of legislatures. Indeed, Caleb Nelson found that the
impetus of the judicial election movement was a desire to promote judicial
independence from the political branches, rather than to increase democratic
accountability for judicial decisions." Mississippi broke the ice in 1832, and by
1909, thirty-five states either entered the Union with judiciaries selected by
partisan election or had converted to partisan elections from appointive
7. MODEL CODE R. 2.4(B).
8. MODEL CODER. 2.4(C).
9. Anthony Champagne & Judith Haydel, Introduction, in JUDICIAL REFORM IN THE STATES 3 (Anthony
Champagne & Judith Haydel eds., 1993) [hereinafter JUDICIAL REFORM IN THE STATES].
10. GEYH, supra note 2, at 24-29.
11. Caleb Nelson, A Reevaluation of Scholarly Explanations for the Rise of the Elective Judiciary in
Antebellum America, 37 Am. J. LEGAL HIST. 190 (1993). See also Kermit L. Hall, Progressive Reform and the
Decline of Democratic Accountability: The Popular Election of State Supreme Court Judges, 1850-1920, 1984
Am. B. FOUND. RES. J. 345; F. Andrew Hanssen, Learning About Judicial Independence, Institutional Change in
State Courts, 33 J. LEGAL STuD. 431, 445-48 (2004); Roy Schotland, Myth, Reality Past and Present, and
Judicial Elections, 35 IND. L. REv. 659, 661-62 (2002).
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systems.12
"By the early twentieth century," Steven Croley writes, "elective judiciaries
were increasingly viewed as plagued by incompetence and corruption." 13 During
the Progressive era, worries that partisan elections led to the selection of less than
capable and qualified judges who were beholden to party bosses culminated in a
fourth form of judicial selection: The nonpartisan election. By 1930, eleven new
states had adopted non-partisan elections as the selection method for their
judiciaries. 14
In the minds of some, however, non-partisan elections left voters with precious
little information upon which to cast an informed ballot, which led to the
selection of less capable and qualified judges. In the minds of others, contested
elections-partisan or not-failed to divorce judges sufficiently from the
political process. 15 In 1913, a fifth method of judicial selection was devised: A
"merit selection" system, in which judges were appointed by the governor from a
pool of candidates whose qualifications had been reviewed and approved by an
independent commission. 16 Judges so appointed would then run unopposed later
in periodic retention elections, where voters would decide whether the judge in
question should be retained for another term. Missouri adopted the first merit
selection plan in 1940. By 1989, twenty-three states had commission-based
appointive systems (with and without retention elections) to select some or all of
their judges:
More recently, the merit selection movement has stalled. Constitutional
amendments to install merit selection systems in Florida, Michigan, Ohio, and
South Dakota have been rejected by voters. Reformers in other jurisdictions have
struggled unsuccessfully to place merit selection proposals on their ballots. And
in some merit selection states, there have been calls for a return to contested
elections.
17
Meanwhile, non-partisan elections have enjoyed a renaissance. Arkansas,
Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, and North Carolina moved from partisan
to non-partisan election systems in the past thirty years. 18 And in 2003, the
American Bar Association retreated from its previous position of exclusive
support for merit selection to a more nuanced series of positions, one being that
12. Hanssen, supra note 11, at 442; Larry C. Berkson, Judicial Selection in the United States: A Special
Report, 64 JUDICATURE 176 (1980).
13. Stephen R Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L.
REv. 689, 723 (1994).
14. Hanssen, supra note 11, at 442.
15. CHARLES SHELDON & LINDA MAULE, CHOOSING JUSTICE: THE RECRUITMENT OF STATE AND FEDERAL
JUDGES 6-7 (1997).
16. JuDICiAL REFORM IN THE STATES, supra note 9, at 7.
17. Matthew J. Streb & Brian Frederick, Judicial Reform and the Future of Judicial Elections, in RUNNING
FOR JUDGE: THE RISING POLmCAL, FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL STAKES OF JUDICIAL ELECIONS 204, 205-06 (Matthew
J. Streb ed. 2007) [hereinafter RUNNING FOR JUDGE].
18. Id. at 210.
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"[f]or states that retain contested judicial elections as a means to select or reselect
their judges, the Commission recommends that all such elections be non-partisan
and conducted in a non-partisan manner."' 9
Today, the American Judicature Society reports 20 that at the supreme court
level, three states select judges by gubernatorial appointment, 2, two by legisla-
tive appointment, eight by partisan election, thirteen by non-partisan election,
and twenty-five by merit selection.22 At the intermediate appellate level, two
states select judges by gubernatorial appointment, 23 two by legislative appoint-
ment, six by partisan election, eleven by nonpartisan election, and eighteen by
merit selection.24 Finally, at the trial level, two states select judges by
gubernatorial appointment,25 two by legislative appointment, nine by partisan
election, eighteen by non partisan election, seventeen by merit selection,26 and
four by a combination of methods. It should be added that, even in states that
employ contested elections, judges are often initially appointed by governors to
fill the unexpired terms of retiring incumbents.
II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: THE PERENNIAL STRUGGLE INTENSIFIED
Each of the five methods of judicial selection described above had its heyday at
a different point in American history. Consensus on the optimal method of
judicial selection has been elusive. Many have asserted that this is because there
is no perfect method of judicial selection, or, more harshly, because there is no
good method of judicial selection.27 A more charitable explanation may be that
19. AM. BAR Ass'N., JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY: REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON THE
21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY 76-77 (2003) (hereinafter JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY), available at http://www.abanet.org/
judind/jeopardy/pdf/report.pdf. The position of the Commission on this point was subsequently adopted by the
American Bar Association.
20. Data discussed in this paragraph is drawn from AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE
STATES: APPELLATE AND GENERAL JURISDICTION COURTS (2007), http://www.ajs.org/selection/docs/Judicial
%20Selection%20Charts.pdf.
21. Id. at 6. Of these four states, two subject judges to reappointment after a term of years, and a third
subjects judges to periodic retention elections.
22. Id. Of these twenty three states, sixteen subject merit-selected judges to periodic retention elections, five
subject them to reappointment after a term of years, and two appoint them for life or until a specified age.
23. Id. at 5. Of these two states, one subjects judges to periodic retention elections, and the other to
reappointment after a term of years.
24. Id. Of these eighteen states, fourteen stand for periodic retention election after a term of years, three are
subject to reappointment, and in one, judges serve until a specified age.
25. Id. at 4. In two of these states, trial judges are subject to reappointment and in the third judges serve until
a specified age.
26. Id. Of those fourteen states, seven subject judges to periodic retention elections, four subject judges to
reappointment, one subjects them to non-partisan elections after a term of years and in two states judges serve
for life or until a specified age.
27. JUDICIAL REFORM IN THE STATES, supra note 9, at 15-16 ("What the sum of these studies of state systems
of judicial selection and efforts to reform those systems tell us is that.., there is no ideal selection
system .... Instead, as one of our co-authors, Jim Drennan once said, 'The experience with the selection of
judges in the states proves conclusively that there is no good way to select judges."'); JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY,
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the objective of a "good" selection system-an optimal balance between judicial
independence and accountability-is an ever-moving target that generates
perennial calls for reform. In recent years, the reform engine has been fueled by a
series of developments that have "politicized" state judicial elections in arguably
unprecedented ways.
A. HEIGHTENED TWO-PARTY COMPETITION
Partisan judicial elections can be relatively sleepy affairs in states where a
single political party is predominant and the outcome of judicial races is all but
assured. Conversely, as Alan Tarr observes, "in states in which party competition
is intense and in which parties establish clear ideological identities, the intensity
tends to spill over into judicial elections. '28 In recent years, significant two-party
competition has become commonplace in states and regions that traditionally
were within the control of only one party:
One of the most dramatic changes during the latter half of the twentieth century
was the spread of two party competition throughout the nation. Many states that
at one time were dominated by a single party, particularly in the South and New
England, now regularly conduct highly competitive elections.29
Studies of judicial reform in North Carolina and Texas link recent selection
reform efforts there to the intensification of two-party competition for judicial
office.3°
B. THE CHANGING NATURE OF SUPREME COURT DOCKETS
As caseloads increased throughout the twentieth century, states sought to
relieve docket pressures on their supreme courts by establishing intermediate
courts of appeal and making their supreme courts' appellate jurisdiction
discretionary. Armed with the discretion to set their own agendas, supreme courts
have increasingly allowed the intermediate courts of appeals to have the final
word in garden-variety disputes where appellate review is limited to correcting
trial court errors, and confined their dockets to more controversial cases in which
supra note 19, at 69 ("Professor Paul Carrington and Adam Long report on a state chief justice who 'not long
ago declared that there is no method of selecting and retaining judges that is worth a damn. He was not the first
to express that wisdom.' Although we need not go quite that far, it is fairly said that there is no perfect selection
system.").
28. G. Alan Tart, State Judicial Selection and Judicial Independence, app. D at 5, in JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY,
supra note 19.
29. Id.
30. James Drennan, Judicial Reform in North Carolina, in JUDICIAL REFORM IN THE STATES, supra note 9, at
19, 26-27; Anthony Champagne, Judicial Reform in Texas, in JuDiciAL REFORM IN THE STATES, supra note 9, at
93, 94-100. But see Melinda Gann Hall, Competition as Accountability in State Supreme Court Elections, in
RUNNING FOR JUDGE, supra note 17, at 165, 179-80 (finding that the "partisan transformation of the south" offers
only a partial explanation for heightened competition in supreme court races).
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the law is unclear and their primary mission is to "say what the law is." The net
effect has been to highlight the policy-making role that state supreme courts play
when filling gaps in constitutional and statutory law and making common law.31
In a related development, Emily Van Tassel explains that "the politicization of
state constitutional decision-making coincides with the 'new Federalism' of the
Reagan era and the willingness of many state appellate courts to look to their own
constitutions for guidance in many areas of law previously left to the federal
constitution. ' 32 That, in turn, has served to "raise the profile of state court judges
and make control over state judgeships seem more significant to a greater range
of interest groups than in the recent past."' 33 To the extent that judges are
perceived as making constitutional policy when called upon to interpret their
constitutions in new and different ways, it may blur the distinction -between
judges and legislators in the public mind and intensify calls to hold judges
politically accountable for their decisions.
C. INCREASED SPENDING IN JUDICIAL RACES
As two-party competition has intensified and the political profile of state
supreme courts has elevated, campaign spending in judicial races has increased.
Average campaign spending in contested supreme court races has increased from
$364,348 in 1990, to $892,755 in 2004.3 4 In 2000, judicial candidates in supreme
court races raised $45 million; 35 in 2002, they raised $29 million; 36 and in 2004,
they raised $42 million.37 While these numbers appear to vary wildly, when
"outlier" races in Alabama, Illinois, and West Virginia are excluded, spending in
the fourteen remaining states that held supreme court elections in 2004 increased
by 163% from 2002, and in 2002, spending increased by 167% from 2000.38
Between 2004 and 2006, average spending on advertising in supreme court races
increased from $1.5 million to $1.6 million; in that time, the median amount
31. PAUL CARRINGTON, DANIEL MEADOR, & MAURICE ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 150 (1976).
32. Emily Field Van Tassel, Challenges to Constitutional Decisions of State Courts and Institutional
Pressures on State Judiciaries, app. E at 3, in JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY, supra note 19.
33. Id.; see also Chris Bonneau, The Dynamics of Campaign Spending in State Supreme Court Elections, in
RUNNING FOR JUDGE, supra note 17, at 59, 64-65; Owen Abbe & Paul Herrnson, Public Financing for Judicial
Elections? A Judicious Perspective on the ABA's Proposal for Campaign Finance Reform, 35 POLITY 535, 539
(2003).
34. Chris Bonneau, The Dynamics of Campaign Spending in State Supreme Court Elections, in RUNNING FOR
JUDGE supra note 17, at 63.
35. AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y, JUDGES UNDER ATTACK: ETHICALLY APPROPRIATE ACTIvrry IN RETENTION
ELECTIONS 2 (2005) (citing COMMON CAUSE OF OHIO, THE POLmCIZATION OF THE JUDICIARY (2005)).
36. Id. (citing Press Relase, Justice at Stake Campaign, 2004 State Supreme Court Election Overview (Mar.
9, 2005)).
37. Id.
38. Rachel Paine Caulfield, Iowa Judges Conference, The Foreboding National Trends in Judicial Elections
2 (June 24, 2005).
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raised increased from $201,623 to $243,910. 3 9
When it comes to fundraising, the focus of attention has been on supreme court
races, where competition for judicial office has been stiffest. Even so, a survey of
over 2400 judges conducted in 2001 found that 45% of lower court judges felt
under pressure to raise money for their campaigns during election years, as
compared to 36% of high court judges.40 In the 2005-2006 election cycle, for
example, trial lawyers and corporate interests in a southern Illinois race
combined to give more than $3.3 million to two candidates for a seat on the state
court of appeals, quadrupling the state record. Madison County witnessed a
$500,000 trial court campaign, and a Missouri trial court judge was defeated after
an out-of-state group poured $175,000 into a campaign to defeat him.
D. INCREASED INTEREST GROUP INVOLVEMENT IN JUDICIAL
CAMPAIGNS
Coinciding with the advent of big league spending in judicial campaigns and
with heightened two-party competition is the advent of big league interest group
involvement. Such involvement often comes in the form of direct contributions to
judicial candidates and independently organized campaigns in support of or
opposition to the candidates. The lion's share of interest group spending has been
on a cluster of issues, traveling under the umbrella of "tort reform," that concern
judicial rulings on issues relating to punitive damages, products liability, medical
malpractice, and insurance liability. As Deborah Goldberg explains, "the tort
wars have pitted the plaintiffs' bar and labor unions, aligned with Democratic
candidates, against the defense bar and business, aligned with Republicans. 41
Thus, in 2006, the two highest sources of contributions were business interests
and lawyers, with 44% of all funds donated by the former and 21% by the latter.42
Outside of groups devoted to the tort reform issue, there have been other interest
groups that have actively sought to defeat incumbents (sometimes successfully)
because of an opinion a judge wrote or joined on such issues as capital
punishment, criminal sentencing, abortion, gay rights, education funding, and
water rights. 3
E. INCREASED NEGATIVE TENOR OF JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS
As James Gibson notes, "the use of attack ads in judicial elections is a
39. JAMES SAMPLE, LAUREN JONES & RACHEL WEISS, THE NEW POLMCS OF JUDICLAL ELECrIONS 2006, at 3, 15
(2007).
40. JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY, supra note 19, at 38.
41. Deborah Goldberg, Interest Group Participation in Judicial Elections, in RUNNING FOR JUDGE, supra note
17, at 73, 81-82; see also Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHio ST. L.J. 43 (2002).
42. SAMPLE, JONES, & WEISS, supra note 39, at 18.
43. Geyh, supra note 41, at 49-50.
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relatively new phenomenon." 44 In 2004 and 2006, approximately 20% of all ads
were negative.45 Increased spending in judicial campaigns and increased interest
group involvement has brought a greater emphasis on negative advertising. In a
2001 poll of judges, 54% of trial judges and 54% of supreme court justices
reported that the conduct and tone of judicial campaigns had gotten worse in the
preceding five years.46 Until quite recently, interest groups and political parties
were responsible for the lion's share of negative television advertising-almost
90% as of 2004; but in 2006, the candidates themselves sponsored 60% of the
negative advertising.47
F. ETHICAL LIMITS ON CAMPAIGN CONDUCT AFTER REPUBLICAN PARTY
OF MINNESOTA V WHITE
Since the 1970s, codes of judicial conduct have imposed significant restric-
tions on judicial speech and association during judicial campaigns. First, judges
have been subject to restrictions on what they can say about issues that may come
before them as judges: The 1972 Model Code of Judicial Conduct forbade judges
from announcing their positions on disputed issues (the "announce clause"),4 8
while the 1990 and 2007 Model Codes prohibit judicial candidates from making
pledges, promises or commitments.49 Second, the Codes restrict a judge's
political activities: For example, judges must not serve as officers in, contribute
to or make speeches on behalf of political organizations; they must not publicly
oppose or endorse other candidates; and they must not solicit campaign funds
other than though their campaign committees.5° By limiting what judges can say
and do in election campaigns, codes of conduct seek to prevent judicial
candidates from becoming fully embroiled in the political process and from
turning judicial races into referenda on their express or implied plans to decide
future cases in, specific ways.
In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, the United States Supreme Court
invalidated the announce clause, holding that judicial candidates have a First
Amendment right to state their views on issues that may come before them later,
as judges.5t In the aftermath of White, the American Bar Association made
modest adjustments to the Model Code in 2003: it deleted a clause that subjected
judges to discipline for appearing to make commitments (but made apparent
44. James Gibson, Challenges to the Impartiality of State Supreme Courts: Legitimacy Theory and "New
Style" Judicial Campaigns 7 (Mar. 21, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
45. SAMPLE, JONES, & WEISS, supra note 39, at 8, n.6.
46. JUSTiCE IN JEOPARDY, supra note 19, at 38.
47. SAMPLE, JONES, & WEISS, supra note 39, at 8.
48. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CoNDucr Canon 7 (1972).
49. MODEL CODER. 2.10(B); MODEL CODER. 4.1 (A)(13); MODEL CODE OF JUDICAL CoNDucr Canon 3B(I0),
5A(3)(d)(1) (1990) [hereinafter 1990 MODEL CODE].
50. MODEL CODE R. 4. 1(A); 1990 MODEL CODE Canon 5A(1); 1990 MODEL CODE Canon 5C(2).
51. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002).
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commitments a new basis for disqualification), and retained the general
prohibitions on pledges, promises, commitments, and political activities.52
Beginning in 2003, the ABA's Joint Commission to Revise the Model Code of
Judicial Conduct revisited the Model Code's restrictions on campaign speech and
conduct, as part of a larger project to revise the entire Code. The Commission
considered three possible courses of action.53 First, it considered embracing the
spirit of White by deregulating campaign speech and conduct generally, as North
Carolina had done. Second, it considered the midrange option of retooling the
political activities canon to accommodate some specific post-White rulings of the
lower courts, which would require the Commission to eliminate several
restrictions on political activities and narrow significantly, if not eliminate the
pledges, promises, and commitments clause. Third, it considered the conserva-
tive approach of limiting the reach of White to its holding, and staying the course
pending further clarification of White from the Supreme Court.
A majority of the Commission remained concerned that the impact of White on
judicial campaigns was deleterious, and was reluctant to deregulate campaign
speech and conduct beyond what was required by the letter of the Supreme
Court's holding. After lengthy deliberations spanning nearly four years, the
Commission effectively chose the third option described above, retaining
existing restrictions on campaign speech and conduct in the political activities
canon. Instead of deregulating campaign speech, the Commission focused its
efforts on restructuring new Canon 4 (former Canon 5) to improve clarity and
specificity, as the ABA's Report to the House of Delegates explained:
Much of the material in Canon 5 was retained, but was reorganized along
several axes. The reorganized Canon 4 differentiates more clearly between
sitting judges who are and are not also judicial candidates and nonjudges who
become candidates. Canon 4 continues to differentiate between judicial
candidates running in public elections and those seeking appointment, and,
within the former category, it further differentiates between partisan, nonparti-
san, and retention elections.54
In the aftermath of White, judicial candidates have challenged remaining
restrictions on their campaign speech and conduct in the lower courts, and while
the results have been somewhat mixed, the trend has favored the challengers.
Several courts have invalidated the pledges and promises clause, while others
52. See MODEL CODER. 2.10(B); MODEL CODER. 2.11(A)(5); MODEL CODER. 4.1(A)(13).
53. I served as Co-Reporter to the Commission and was in attendance at all Commission meetings. The
views expressed here, however, are my own and are not necessarily shared by the Commission or its members.
54. AM. BAR Ass'N JOINT COMM'N TO EVALUATE THE MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, REPORT No. 200,
REVISED MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 150 (2007).
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have struck down restrictions on political activities.55 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, revisiting other issues presented by the White case
on remand from the Supreme Court, held that Minnesota could not discipline
judicial candidates for engaging in partisan activities (notwithstanding Minneso-
ta's purported interest in preserving the nonpartisan character of its judicial
elections), or bypassing their campaign committees and soliciting funds directly
from groups.56
Since 2002, when White was decided, interest groups on the political left and
right have capitalized on the decision by submitting questionnaires to the
candidates that solicit the candidates' views on a range of issues likely to come
before them as judges, which the candidates ignore at their peril. 57 Indeed, some
interest groups have been explicit about supporting only those candidates that
respond.58
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS FOR JUDICIAL
SELECTION REFORM
If Professor Roy Schotland had licensed his characterization of judicial races
as "noisier, nastier and costlier" when he made the statement in the 1980s, the
royalties would have made him a rich man today. Accompanying the noise, the
nastiness, and the cost is a fundamental shift in the justification for elected
judiciaries: Judicial elections were originally introduced primarily to promote
judicial independence by liberating judges from the control of governors and
legislators, 59 but they have since morphed into tools that serve primarily to
promote judicial accountability. There seems to be a general consensus that the
recent developments described in the preceding section are making judicial
elections look and feel more like conventional political branch races, in the sense
of being more competitive and costly, with more interest groups taking sides in
more acrimonious contests, and more candidates taking positions on the often
policy-laden issues that the candidates will be called upon to resolve as
office-holders. Where the consensus breaks down is as to whether these
developments are welcome and which judicial selection system is best suited to
counter or accommodate them.
55. For a good summary of post-White litigation, see Brennan Center for Justice, Summaries of Relevant
Cases Decided Since Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, http://www.brennancenter.org/stack detail.asp?
key=348&subkey=35327 (last visited Apr. 22, 2008) (summarizing post-White cases).
56. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 766 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
57. Deborah Goldberg, Interest Group Participation in Judicial Elections, in RUNNING FOR JUDGE, supra note
17, at 84.
58. Caulfield, supra note 38, at 5; see also SAMPLE, JONES, & WEISS, supra note 39, at 30-34.
59. Reformers behind the original partisan election movement exhibited less concern for promoting
democratic accountability than enhancing judicial independence. As F Andrew Hanssen explains, "Judicial
elections were intended, first and foremost, to provide judges with an independent power base that would enable
them to stand up to legislative pressure." Hanssen, supra note 11, at 447.
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A. PARTISAN ELECTIONS
Contemporary proponents of partisan judicial elections proceed from the
premise that, in a democratic republic, voters should choose the public officials
who govern them and should be able to hold them accountable for their
performance in office. Underlying this premise is the general assumption that
judges are not significantly different from other public officials, or are not
different in ways that warrant a different system of selection. A related
assumption is that voters in judicial and political branch races are comparably
motivated and equipped to distinguish good candidates from bad-or at least that
voters in judicial races are not so unmotivated and ill-equipped as to undermine
the legitimacy of the choices they make.
In an article I wrote several years ago, I questioned whether voters in judicial
elections were adequately motivated and informed to hold judges accountable in
a meaningful way, by pointing to data showing that a substantial majority of the
public did not vote in judicial races and was unfamiliar with the candidates.60
Recent research suggests that my concern was well-founded in traditional, less
competitive races. Available data confirms an often substantial "roll-off' in
judicial races, in which voters who come to the polls vote in executive and
legislative branch races but not in judicial.6t The roll-off is commonly attributed
to a lack of information about the candidates,62 and indeed, in a poll of American
voters conducted in 2001, 73% reported that they had only some or a little
information about judicial candidates, while 14% reported having none.'63 In their
study of judicial elections in the news, Brian Schaffner and Jennifer Segal
Diascro conclude that "we should not be surprised to find citizens lacking
information about judicial races" because "citizens turning to newspapers for
information on state supreme court campaigns will find a dearth of coverage on
these contests." 64
It can be argued, however, that more competitive judicial races, particularly in
a post-White environment, are increasing voter interest and information levels
enough to hold judges meaningfully accountable.65 In a comparison between two
Ohio Supreme Court races, Laurence Baum and David Klein found that the voter
60. Geyh, supra note 41, at 53.
61. Martin P. Wattenberg, Ian McAllister, & Anthony Salvanto, How Voting is Like Taking an SAT Test: An
Analysis of American Voter Rolloff, 28 AM. POL. Q. 234 (2000).
62. Lawrence Baum & David Klein, Voter Responses to High-Visibility Judicial Campaigns, in RuNNING FOR
JUDGE, supra note 17, at 140, 141.
63. Justice at Stake Campaign, Poll ofAmerican Voters. Conducted by Greenberg, Quinlan, Rosner Research
Inc. (2001).
64. Brian Schaffner & Jennifer Segal Diascro, Judicial Elections in the News, in RUNNING FOR JUDGE, supra
note 17, at 115, 134.
65. In my defense, I acknowledged this development when White was decided, but argued that the kind of
accountability that highly competitive elections promote is inconsistent with judicial independence and
impartiality. See Geyh, supra note 41, at 64.
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roll-off rate was twice as high for the low visibility race as for the hotly contested
one (although they also found that in the hotly contested race, voters acquired
only a slender grasp of the issues at stake).66 Melinda Gann Hall observes that
"without the excitement generated by hard-fought campaigns from contending
candidates, information upon which to cast votes is poor, and voters are
disinterested and unmotivated to participate. 67 Now that judicial elections have
become noisier, nastier and costlier, we have more challengers and more defeated
incumbents, leading Hall to conclude that "when we consider tangible indicators
of electoral accountability, we see that, under most situations, supreme court
elections perform quite well, particularly in the last decade or so."' 68 Rachel
Caulfield found that in the post-White era, states that have deregulated judicial
speech the most "are seeing a change in how candidates promote themselves and
how they attack their opponents," leading her to conclude that "it is entirely
possible that judicial candidates in these states will increasingly rely on the
ability to distinguish themselves from their opponents based on controversial
issue positions. 69 Schaffner & Diascro concur that after White, "candidates may
be more likely to speak out on a wider array of topics during campaigns, a
dynamic that would produce more news for reporters to cover," which they view
as a welcome development "if judicial elections are to compel accountability in
the judiciary., 70
Recent data thus reveal that the brave new world of expensive, high-profile,
hotly contested judicial races creates greater voter interest, puts incumbents at
higher risk of defeat, and to that extent promotes "accountability"-in an
unvarnished sense of the term. Hall is quite explicit about the kind of
accountability that judicial elections facilitate:
Electoral competition enhances the ability of voters to voice disapproval of
incumbents and remove unpopular ones, thereby bringing the judiciary better
in line with citizen preferences. Moreover, competition serves to structure the
decisions of judges once on the bench when judges' preferences are inconsis-
tent with those of their constituencies.71
And since competition is the most intense in partisan races, the argument
concludes, it is in partisan races that judicial accountability of this kind will be
66. Laurence Baum & David Klein, Voter Responses to High-Visibility Campaigns, in RUNNING FOR JUDGE,
supra note 17, at 142.
67. Melinda Gann Hall, Competition as Accountability in State Supreme Court Elections, in RUNNING FOR
JUDGE, supra note. 17, at 166.
68. Id. at 183.
69. Rachel Caulfield, The Changing Tone of Judicial Campaigns as a Result of White, in RUNNING FOR
JUDGE, supra note 17, at 34, 55-56.
70. Brian Schaffner & Jennifer Segal Diascro, Judicial Elections in the News, in RUNNING FOR JUDGE, supra
note 17, at 136.
71. Melinda Gann Hall, Competition as Accountability in State Supreme Court Elections, in RUNNING FOR
JUDGE, supra note 17, at 166.
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promoted most effectively.
The critical question is whether this is the kind of accountability that we want
judicial elections to promote. If, as Hall and a significant segment of the political
science community believe, independent judges are essentially unconstrained
policymakers who decide cases by acting on their personal "preferences" or
"attitudes," then the answer would seem to be yes, because elections will produce
"public policies that better represent the citizenry" by "creating incentives for
judges to pay attention to citizen preferences when deciding highly visible and
publicly salient issues.",
72
If, on the other hand, as the mainstream legal community believes, indepen-
dent judges do their best to follow "the law," flexibly defined (and consistent with
the legal model described at the beginning of this paper), then the answer is
presumably no, because elections create incentives for judges to set the law to
one side and "pay attention to citizen preferences" when deciding cases. Indeed,
the judge who openly defers to the electorate's preferences when deciding cases
exposes herself to discipline and removal for violating multiple rules in the
Model Code of Judicial Conduct: The duty not to be swayed by public clamor or
fear of criticism; the duty to uphold and apply the law and perform all duties of
judicial office impartially; and the duty to act at all times in a manner than
promotes public confidence in the independence and impartiality of the
judiciary.73
The "attitudinal model" of judicial decision-making 74 that drives the thinking
of many political scientists is only now beginning to be challenged in a serious
way by scholars within the legal community.75 I cannot do that debate justice
here; suffice it to say, however, that its implications for judicial selection are
considerable.
B. NONPARTISAN ELECTIONS
Devotees of non-partisan elections proceed from the assumption that judges
are different from other elected officials in ways that justify a different selection
process: Whereas governors and legislators may follow partisan agendas, judges
must follow the law. Those who favor non-partisan elections worry that recent
politicization of judicial races has made "politicians" of judges, whose election
increasingly turns on their currying favor with contributors, interest groups and
voters by signaling in advance how they are likely to rule on hot-button legal
issues that may come before their courts. They argue, however, that the worst
72. Id. at 167.
73. MODEL CODE R. 1.2; MODEL CODE R. 2.2; MODEL CODE R. 2.4(A). For an excellent elaboration on these
issues, see David Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 265 (2008).
74. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SuiREmE COuRT AND THE A"rrrIurNAL MODEL (1993).
75. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, 4 PERSP. ON POL. 261 (2006).
1272 [Vol. 21:1259
THE ENDLESS JUDICIAL SELECTION DEBATE
excesses have occurred in partisan election states, where judicial candidates are,
by definition, partisans and where competition for judicial office has been most
intense.
Data confirm that partisan races are, on average, more heated than nonpartisan
races. The spending difference between partisan and non-partisan races is stark:
between 1990 and 2004, average spending in contested non-partisan elections
was $549,160, as compared to $885,177 in partisan races.76 Overall, the
percentage of supreme court races in which the incumbent ran unopposed has
been 16.9% higher in nonpartisan contests.77 And between 1980 and 2000, defeat
rates for incumbents in non-partisan races were 7.4% as compared to 22.9% in
partisan races. 78 One explanation for this data, however, may be that non-partisan
races are less politicized because they furnish voters with insufficient information
to promote competitive races; partisan affiliation can serve as a rough proxy for
the candidate's views on a range of issues that furnish voters with information
they deem relevant to casting an informed ballot.
That said, non-partisan races have recently become much more competitive
affairs. In the 1980s, 40.8% of non-partisan judicial elections were contested, as
compared to 62.5% in the 1990s (in partisan races, the percentage of contested
races increased from 58.8% to 83. 1%). 7 9 And a recent study conducted by
Matthew Streb found that so-called "non-partisan" races may not be as
non-partisan as commonly assumed:
How involved are party organizations in nonpartisan judicial campaigns? The
answer appears to be that they are quite involved. While parties are not equally
active in all aspects of nonpartisan judicial elections (and not necessarily active
in every election cycle), they seem to be especially important in terms of
GOTV [get out the vote] efforts and increasing name recognition, candidate
recruitment, candidate endorsements, coordinating campaigns with candidates,
and even raising and contributing money.80
Of greater concern, perhaps, is the impact of White on the future of
non-partisan elections. If candidates are held to have a constitutional right to
announce their partisan affiliations and engage in partisan activities in non-
partisan races, as the United States Court of Appeals ruled in White on remand,
the practical differences between partisan and nonpartisan elections may
gradually disappear. We have already seen, in states such as Michigan and Ohio,
76. Chris Bonneau, The Dynamics of Campaign Spending in State Supreme Court Elections, in RUNNING FOR
JUDGE, supra note 17, at 63-64.
77. Melinda- Gann Hall, Competition as Accountability in State Supreme Court Elections, in RUNNING FOR
JUDGE, supra note 17, at 172.
78. Id. at 177-78.
79. Id. at 173.
80. Matthew Streb, Partisan Involvement in Partisan and Nonpartisan Trial Court Elections, in RUNNING
FOR JUDGE, supra note 17, at 96, 102.
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where a nominally non-partisan general election is preceded by an openly
partisan primary election process, that the resulting contests can be every bit as
heated as in conventional partisan election states. In light of data indicating that
when states relax campaign speech regulations in response to White, candidates
alter their campaign speech to capitalize on the relaxed requirements,8 1 it is
reasonable to predict that the same will occur if partisan activities restrictions are
lifted.
C. MERIT SELECTION WITH RETENTION ELECTION
Advocates of merit selection, like proponents of non-partisan election, proceed
from the premise that a judge's duty to follow the law makes judges sufficiently
different from other public officials to warrant a different method of selection.
The two camps part company, however, over the relative merits of contested
elections. Supporters of merit selection operate on three assumptions: First, that
contested elections are not a good way to ensure the selection of capable and
qualified judges; second, that contested elections are inimical to judicial
independence because they put judges at risk of losing their jobs for making
decisions that are unpopular with voters who are incapable of discerning when a
judge has followed the law, committed an honest error, or made an illegitimate
power grab; and third, that "politicization" of judicial selection in hotly contested
races diminishes public confidence in the courts. A system in which governors
appoint judges from a pool of candidates pre-qualified by an independent
commission, they maintain, is better suited to ensure that judges are selected on
the basis of merit. To accommodate entrenched public preferences for judicial
elections, merit selection systems typically provide for retention elections that,
by virtue of being non-competitive, are less likely to become highly politicized,
independence-threatening affairs that diminish public confidence in the courts.
Available data undercut the assumption that merit selection systems produce
"better" judges: A study conducted in the 1980s comparing the resumes of judges
chosen in contested elections and in merit selection systems found no significant
differences-they possess comparable legal and judicial experience, and elected
judges were no more likely than their merit-selected counterparts to have partisan
political backgrounds.82 On a related note, recent research reveals that there is no
meaningful difference between the systems in terms of the racial or gender
diversity of the judges selected.8 3 That said, it is more difficult to quantify
81. See Caulfield, supra note 17, at 49-55.
82. Henry Glick & Craig Emmert, Selection Systems and Judicial Characteristics: The Recruitment of State
Supreme Court Judges, 70 JUDICATURE 228, 231-35 (1987).
83. Mark S. Hurwitz & Drew Noble Lanier, Explaining Judicial Diversity: The DifferentialAbility of Women
and Minorities to Attain Seats on State Supreme and Appellate Courts, 3 ST. POL. & POL'Y Q. 329, 345 (2003).
For earlier research, see Malia Reddick, Merit Selection: A Review of the Social Scientific Literature, 106 DICK.
L. REv. 729,740-41 (2002).
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intangibles that could support the conclusion that merit-selected judges are
"better" qualified, such as whether, on average, they possess a more judicial
temperament, are predisposed to be more impartial and independent, or to think
about the judicial role in less partisan or otherwise political ways. A California
study, for example, compared judges initially appointed to those initially elected
and found that between 1990 and 1999, 29.8 out of every thousand judges
initially appointed had been disciplined, as compared to 43.6 out of every
thousand judges who had been initially elected. 84
Recent data appear to corroborate the assumption that elected judges are more
likely to align their decision-making with popular preferences than appointed
judges, and to that extent are less independent. In their study of state supreme
court reviews of capital cases, Paul Brace and Brent Boyea found "compelling
but circumstantial evidence that state supreme court judges in capital cases may
vote with an eye toward the next election," and that "appointed judges and judges
that are retiring all exhibit a higher propensity to over turn capital convictions
than elective judges who are not retiring,, 85 leading them to a conclusion worth
quoting at length:
In the end, the patterns revealed here indicate that judicial elections expose
judges to public sentiment and, on this very salient issue at least, they respond
by adjusting their voting in a manner than is consistent with public opinion. On
this particular issue too, elections serve to recruit judges who share the public's
values. Elections thus function in a manner commonly valued in some
democratic theories, producing elite responsiveness to mass opinions. When it
comes to judicial elections, however, our findings may give pause to those who
value judicial impartiality, particularly when it comes to a matter of life and
death.86
Other studies have reached similar conclusions.87 Earlier studies comparing
decision-making behavior of elected and merit selected judges, however, found
no meaningful correlation between selection method and decision-making
behavior.8 8 The discrepancy allows for several possible explanations: Voter
84. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE, SUMMARY OF DISCIPLINARY STATIsTIcs
1990-1999, at 13 (2000).
85. Paul Brace & Brent Boyea, Judicial Selection Methods and Capital Punishment in the American States,
in RUNNING FOR JUDGE, supra note 17, at 186, 193-94, 197.
86. Id. at 199.
87. Richard R.W. Brooks & Stephen Raphael, Life Terms or Death Sentences: The Uneasy Relationship
Between Judicial Elections and Capital Punishment, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 609 (2003); Jason J.
Czarnezki, Voting and Electoral Politics in the Wisconsin Supreme Court, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 323,324 (2003).
88. See, e.g., RICHARD WATSON & RONDAL DOWNING, THE POLrIC OF BENCH AND BAR 324-26 (1969)
(finding no difference between elected and merit-selected judges in their support for plaintiffs in personal injury
litigation); Burton Atkins & Henry Glick, Formal Judicial Recruitment and State Supreme Court Decisions, 2
AM. POL Q. 427 (1974) (finding no difference in decision-making behavior between merit selected and
appointed judges with references to categories of litigant); Jerome O'Callaghan, Another Test for the Merit
Plan, 14 JUST. SYs. J. 477 (1991) (finding no difference in drunk driving cases).
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influence in contested elections may be limited to a few, highly salient issues
(such as capital punishment); voter influence in contested elections may be on the
rise as judicial elections become more competitive; or retention elections in merit
selection systems, despite being less competitive than contested elections, may
nonetheless influence judicial behavior in comparable ways.
Research reveals that in merit selection systems, politics can play a role in
selecting members of nominating commissions, in the deliberations of such
commissions, and in the judges that governors ultimately choose from the
approved candidate pool.89 In response, the American Bar Association has
developed standards for judicial selection that underscore the importance of
preserving the independent, non-partisan character of judicial nominating
commissions. 90 To conclude from these developments, however-as some
have-that merit selection systems simply move the politics of judicial selection
from the ballot box to a back room misses an important point: the primary threat
to independence arises at the point of re-selection, when judges are at put at risk
of losing their jobs for unpopular decisions that they previously made. And on
that score, there is ample support for the conclusion that, with notable exceptions,
the prospect of an incumbent losing her seat in a retention election because of
isolated, unpopular decisions is quite low. Whereas 23% of incumbent supreme
court justices lost reelection bids in partisan elections between 1980 and 2000,
and 7.4% lost in non-partisan races, the failure rate in retention elections was
only 1.8%. And between 1964 and 1998, only 52 of 4,588 candidates in retention
elections were not retained. 91
Finally, there is support for the conclusion that highly politicized judicial races
diminish public confidence in the courts. In his Kentucky-based study, James
Gibson found that "when groups with direct connections to the decision-maker
give contributions, legitimacy suffers substantially. '' 92 He likewise found that
when candidates use attack ads, legitimacy is adversely affected, albeit to a lesser
degree.93 Gibson also explored the impact of candidate position-taking on public
confidence, and found none, adding that "even promises to decide cases in
specific ways have no consequences at all for the legitimacy of the institution"-
although I question the validity of this finding, given the problematic vignette he
used to elicit public reactions in his survey.94
89. See Reddick, supra note 83, at 732-34.
90. AM. BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS ON STATE JUDICIAL SELECTION: REPORT OF THE COMMvISSION ON STATE
JUDICIAL SELECTION STANDARDS (2000), available at http://www.abanet.org/judind/downloads/reformat.pdf.
91. Larry Aspin, Trends in Judicial Retention Elections, 1964-1998, 83 JUDICATURE 79(1999).
92. Gibson, supra note 44, at 17; see also Geyh, supra note 41, at 54-55.
93. Gibson, supra note 44, at 19. The author notes that these findings applied equally to legislative races.
94. The survey solicited reactions to a vignette in which a judge talks about his views on law suit abuse,
abortion, and the death penalty, and "promises that, if reelected, he will decide these kinds of cases the way that
most people in Kentucky want them decided." It is to be expected that respondents would be untroubled by this
scenario, because the judge was, in effect, simply saying, "When cases come before me, I promise to do what
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D. APPOINTMENT WITHOUT RE-SELECTION
In the current debate, few have argued for a system of legislative appointment.
Some (including I) have argued that the optimal system for judicial selection is
one in which judges are appointed by governors from a pool of commission-
approved candidates, with or without legislative confirmation, who, once
appointed, are not subject to reselection (via reappointment, retention election, or
contested election). 95 Such arguments operate from the premise that an appoint-
ive system alone promotes judicial independence by ensuring that a judge will
not be put at risk of losing her job for making unpopular decisions that comport
with the law as the judge reads it. Proponents of appointive systems assume that
accountability is better promoted by means other than the ballot box: appellate
review, constitutional amendment, adverse publicity, and intra-judicial disciplin-
ary processes, and of course, prospective accountability fostered by the
appointment process itself.
Although few judges actually lose their retention bids in merit selection states,
the real issue is whether judges nonetheless fear defeat at the ballot box and act
on that fear by deciding cases differently than they otherwise would. Malia
Reddick reports on a 1991 survey of judges who recently stood for retention, in
which three-fifths of respondents reported that "retention elections had a
pronounced effect on their behavior on the bench"; only 14% believed that
retention elections gave them independence from the voters, while "the
remaining judges perceived themselves as responding to their environment. 96
As far as other accountability-promoting mechanisms are concerned, the
Model Code of Judicial Conduct includes rules directing judges to be "faithful
to" or to "uphold and apply" the law.97 These rules have been used more often
than one might suppose to discipline and sometimes remove judicial officers who
chronically or flagrantly disregard the rule of law in a range of contexts.98
you would do." The exceptional respondent who is well-versed in or intuitively embraces a counter-majoritarian
role for the courts may find such a promise problematic, but it is hardly surprising that most would not, given
polling data showing that 56% of the public agrees with the statement that court opinions should be in line with
voter values and judges who repeatedly ignore those values should be impeached. Martha Neil, Half of U.S.
Sees 'Judicial Activism Crisis', 4 A.B.A. J. EREPORT 40 (2005). Rather, the promises of primary concern to
White critics are promises to decide particular issues or cases in specified ways, where the adverse consequences
for impartiality are much more obvious. Had the vignette featured a judge who promised to affirm all drunk
driving or capital convictions regardless of the facts, to side with mothers in all custody disputes, or to invalidate
all abortion restrictions regardless of the law, it is quite possible that his survey results would be different.
95. Geyh, supra note 41, at 72-79; JusTIcE IN JEOPARDY, supra note 19, at 70-74.
96. Reddick, supra note 83, at 739-40 (discussing Larry Aspin & William Hall, Retention Elections and
Judicial Behavior, 77 JUDICATrE 306 (1994)).
97. MODEL CODE R. 2.2; 1990 MODEL CODE Canon 3B(2).
98. JEFFREY SHAMAN, STEvEN LUBET, JAMEs ALFtIN, & CHARLEs GEYH, JUDICIAL CONDUCT & ETHIcs
§§ 2.02-2.11 (4th ed. forthcoming 2008).
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IV. WHERE TO FROM HERE?
Ultimately, which of the various systems for judicial selection is "best"
depends upon what one is looking for. If one is looking for a system that
maximizes democratic accountability, then available data suggest that partisan
elections will ordinarily be optimal. Conversely, if one is looking for a system
that maximizes judicial independence, simple appointment (with or without a
nominating commission) that does not subject incumbents to a reselection
process will usually be the best bet. Non-partisan election and merit selection/
retention election systems seek to strike a balance between these relative
extremes, with non-partisan election systems placing somewhat greater emphasis
on democratic accountability and merit selection/retention elections opting for
somewhat greater independence.
Arguments over the relative merits of democratic accountability and judicial
independence may be deeply normative, but turn in large part on an unresolved
empirical question of considerable importance: Whether independent judges
follow the law, and if so, how and to what extent. If the answer is "no," as many
political scientists believe, then the primary justification for judicial indepen-
dence disappears.99 If law does not constrain judges in any meaningful way-if
independent judges are essentially rogue policymakers-the norms of a demo-
cratic republic dictate that judges be brought under greater popular control, so
that the preferences judges act upon are better aligned with their "constituents."
Conversely, if, as most judges and lawyers believe, the answer is to some
significant extent "yes"-if independent judges do indeed take law seriously-
then judicial independence is back in the game. To study this question demands a
more serious interdisciplinary effort than has occurred to date-and that is no
mean feat. Too many political scientists and lawyers look at each other and shake
their heads, so captured by the predispositions of their respective disciplines that
they are unable or unwilling to take the other seriously.1t° For those who have
been struggling to preserve and promote an independent judiciary, however, the
time has come to confirm the empirical foundations upon which their case rests,
or rethink their premises.
I share Barry Friedman's impressionistic sense that outside the political
science subfield of attitudinal model scholars, "most likely there is agreement
99. If there is no reality to the rule of law, the only remaining justification for judicial independence would
seem to be a highly precarious one, that public confidence in the judiciary turns on promoting the rule of law
"myth," a key component of which is judicial independence. See Gibson, supra note 44, at 5-6 (discussing the
"myth of legality" and how it is preserved by exposing the public to legitimizing "symbols of impartiality and
insulation from ordinary political pressures"); see also Charles Gardner Geyh, The Judgment of the Boss on
Bossing the Judges: Bruce Springsteen, Judicial Independence and the Rule of Law, 14 WIDENER L.J. 885,
902-05 (2005) (discussing the "mythical aspects" of the rule of law).
100. For an excellent discussion of the divide that separates academic lawyers and political scientists, see
Friedman, supra note 75, at 261-262.
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that attitudes and law both play a role-the question is how much, and more
particularly, how much law can constrain. To state it differently, the question is
not so much whether law plays a role, as what role it plays."' ' If so, then judicial
independence remains a value worth preserving, but the operative question
continues to be how much independence in relation to democratic accountability
is optimal. Put another way, when (if ever) does the cost of enabling judges to act
upon their political preferences or attitudes by insulating them from democratic
accountability exceed the benefits of protecting them from threats to their tenure
that compromise their capacity to adhere to the rule of law?
These are big questions that call for big choices between selection systems.
Constitutional reform culminating in changes on this order of magnitude is a rare
event. It can be a worthy goal and one well worth pursuing (as I have argued
elsewhere), but not at the expense of ignoring shorter-term remedies that can
make a bad system better in the interim. From the vantage point of those who
want greater democratic accountability, the short-term solution is simply to let
nature take its course, because the current trajectory of judicial races across the
country is already leading in that direction. For those seeking to promote an
independent judiciary in the teeth of recent developments, more modest reforms
proposed by scholars and organizations, include:
" Increasing the length of judicial terms, to reduce the frequency with which
judicial tenure is put at risk.10 2
" Encouraging candidates to adopt voluntary campaign standards, to reduce
negative campaigning and thwart the impact of White. 10 3
" Continuing to defend existing ethical restrictions on judicial campaign
conduct against constitutional challenge, at least until the Supreme Court
clarifies the limits of White. 104
" Developing more comprehensive judicial evaluation programs to provide
voters in retention elections with more meaningful information about
incumbents that reorient voter focus toward behavioral, rather than deci-
sional accountability. 105
" Increasing public knowledge about the role of the judiciary in American
101. Id. at 264.
102. Roy Schotland, The Crocodile in the Bathtub ... and Other Arguments to Extend Terms for Trial
Judges, CAL. CTs. REV., Fall 2005, at 10; Call to Action: Statement of the National Summit on Improving
Judicial Selection, 34 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1353, 1355 (2001).
103. Charles Gardner Geyh, Preserving Public Confidence in the Courts in an Age of Individual Rights and
Public Skepticism, in BENCH-PRESS: THE COLLISION OF THE COURTS, POLITcS AND THE MEDIA (2007); see also
THE CONSTITUTION PRoJEcT, HIGHER GROUND STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR JUDICIAL CANDIDATES (2000),
http:llwww.constitutionprojecLorg/pdf/ThepHigherGroundStandards.of_Conduct_for_JudicialCandidates.
pdf.
104. Geyh, supra note 103.
105. Seth Andersen, Judicial Retention Evaluation Programs, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1375 (2001).
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government, which has been shown to increase public support for judicial
independence. 106
" Taking judicial discipline seriously, as a means to underscore an important
way in which judges who behave badly are properly held accountable.107
" Public financing of judicial campaigns at the appellate level, to reduce the
influence of money on judicial races. 108
" Expanding use of voter guides as a means to better inform voters about the
candidates.109
V. CONCLUSION
In our existing legal structure, states lay claim to having independent
judiciaries, whose judges take oaths to uphold the law. They have codes of
judicial conduct that direct judges, on pain of discipline and removal, to follow
the law and resist public and political pressure to do otherwise. And they require
judges in all courts of general jurisdiction to have training and experience in the
law, because unlike legislators and governors who make or execute the law,
judges who interpret the law must possess special expertise that non-lawyers
lack. These features of the legal structure are compatible with judicial elections as
originally conceived. As originally envisioned, contested elections were to
promote judicial independence and the rule of law by transferring control of
judicial selection from manipulative governors and legislatures to the people, and
were to promote behavioral accountability by weeding out the incompetent, the
lazy and the corrupt.
In the new world order, however, the primary justification for contested
judicial elections has moved from preserving judicial independence and behav-
ioral accountability to promoting decisional accountability by subjecting judges
to loss of tenure for making decisions unpopular with the electorate. This new
justification is fundamentally incompatible with the principles that underlie the
existing legal structure. It assumes either that average voters are able to review
judicial decisions for themselves and intelligently second guess a judge's
interpretations of law, or that the decisions judges make are matters of public
policy rather than law, which voters have a right to control. The first assumption
is at odds with the notion embedded in state law, that intelligently interpreting the
law requires judges who have years of legal training and expertise that
106. James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Knowing About Courts 23-24 (2007), http://papers.ssm.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=956562.
107. JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY, supra note 19, at 58-59.
108. Am. BAR ASs'N., PUBLIC FINANCING OF JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS: REPORT OF THE COMISSION ON PUBLIC
FINANCING OF JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS (2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/judind/pdf/commissionreport
4-03.pdf. But see Michael MALBIN & THOMAS GAs, THE DAY AFTER REFORM: SOBERING CAMPAIGN FINANCE
LESSONS FROM THE AMERICAN STATES (1997) (questioning the viability of public financing).
109. Call to Action, supra note 102, at 1357.
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non-lawyers lack. The second assumption-that judges simply make policy
masquerading as law-guts the rule of law altogether and de-legitimizes
constitutional structures and codes of conduct that preserve judicial indepen-
dence.
Looking toward the future, there are three possibilities. First, we may simply
continue to live with cognitive dissonance: highly competitive judicial elections
and democratic accountability may be incompatible with the rule of law and
judicial independence, but practical impediments to systemic change suggest that
our time is better spent on incremental reform that reduces the incompatibility.110
Second, we may adjust the underlying legal structure to accommodate a new
world of competitive judicial elections, by gradually distancing ourselves from
the rule of law as a fiction of the bygone formalist age, and embracing contested
elections and the democratic accountability they promote.1 ' Third, we may
adjust judicial selection systems to accommodate the existing legal structure by
moving away from highly competitive contested elections that are fundamentally
at odds with the rule of law and an independent judiciary. 11 2
I10. See, e.g., Roy Schotland, Summit on Improving Judicial Selection, Introduction: Personal Views, 34
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1361 (2001).
111. See, e.g., Michael Dimino, Judicial Elections Versus Merit Selection: The Futile Quest for a System of
Judicial "Merit" Selection, 67 ALa. L. REy. 803 (2004).
112. See, e.g., Geyh, supra note 41, at 58-61.
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